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Abstract: The fear that business corporations have claimed unwarranted constitutional 
protections which have entrenched corporate power has produced a broad social movement 
demanding that constitutional rights be restricted to human beings and corporate personhood 
be abolished. We develop a critique of these proposals organized around the three salient 
rationales we identify in the accompanying narrative, which we argue reflect a narrow focus 
on large business corporations, a misunderstanding of the legal concept of personhood, and a 
failure to distinguish different kinds of constitutional rights and the reasons for assigning 
them. Corporate personhood and corporate constitutional rights are not problematic per se 
once these notions are decoupled from biological, metaphysical or moral considerations. The 
real challenge is that we need a principled way of thinking about the priority of human over 
corporate persons which does not reduce the efficacy of corporate institutions or harm liberal 
democracies. 
 




* University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire Business School, UK. Email: d.gindis@herts.ac.uk. 
** Loyola University Chicago, Quinlan School of Business, USA. Email: asinger2@luc.edu. 
We are grateful to Bruce Barry, Francesca Gagliardi, Kent Greenfield, Geoff Hodgson, Sam Mansell, 
Ben Manski, Martin Petrin, Philip Pettit, Katharina Pistor, Elizabeth Pollman, Susanna Ripken, Bertrand 






In The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurman Arnold (1937, p. 185) wrote that “the ideal that a 
great corporation is endowed with the rights and prerogatives of a free individual is as 
essential to the acceptance of corporate rule in temporal affairs as was the ideal of the divine 
right of kings in an earlier day.” This observation resonates with today’s critics of corporate 
power, particularly those concerned about the extent of the constitutional protections 
corporations have claimed in America. There is something Arnoldian in the recent “corporate 
civil rights movement” (Piety, 2016) exemplified in the Supreme Court’s controversial 
decisions in Citizens United, which held that independent political expenditures by 
corporations were to be protected as freedom of speech rights,1 and Hobby Lobby, which 
seemed to expand religious freedom protections to business corporations.2    
The fear that such decisions have corroded American democracy led to the formation of 
a bona fide social movement demanding a constitutional amendment that restricts 
constitutional rights to human beings and abolishes corporate personhood.3 The narrative 
mobilized by what Susanna Ripken (2011) calls the “corporate abolitionist movement” is not 
new, but against the backdrop of the Great Recession, the perception that the Supreme Court 
had sided with big business hit a nerve. Support for the abolitionist proposals among local 
governments, state legislatures, and federal lawmakers has spread. Although the proposed 
amendment is unlikely to be adopted, the movement should not be taken lightly: even failed 
 
1 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
3 This debate is distinctly American. The European Court of Justice, for example, routinely talks about 
the fundamental rights of companies without creating any controversy (Oliver, 2015).  
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attempts to amend the Constitution can lead to significant political change through sustained 
public deliberation about the institutional foundations of society (Hartley, 2017).  
We share the movement’s legitimate concern that excessive corporate power may have 
adverse effects on the functioning of modern democracies. We doubt, however, that the 
abolitionist proposals constitute the appropriate remedy. To explain why, we identify and 
reconstruct three kinds of justifications for corporate abolitionism – which we label the 
“Plutocracy Rationale,” the “Absurdity Rationale,” and the “Distinctiveness Rationale” – and 
proceed to evaluate each in turn, independently of given Supreme Court decisions or the 
campaign finance debate.4 Abolitionism, we contend, is a blunt instrument that downplays the 
societal and political benefits of corporate personhood, misunderstands the legal notion of 
personhood, and fails to distinguish different kinds of constitutional rights and the reasons for 
assigning them.  
Given that the legal assignment of personhood and rights need not rely upon essentialist 
considerations about the qualities of candidate persons or rights-holders (Gindis, 2016), there 
is no coherent reason why we cannot recognize corporations as persons with rights while also 
denying them the full set of rights and privileges that we reserve for human beings. That said, 
the extension of rights to corporations may be taken too far. We therefore need a principled 
way of ensuring the priority of human persons over their corporate counterparts which does 
not reduce the efficacy of corporate institutions or harm liberal democracy. This question, we 
submit, cannot be decided categorically (Singer, 2019). The answer may instead lie in 
philosophical pragmatism and its commitment to institutional experimentation and social 
deliberation.  
 
4 We reference key Supreme Court decisions but do not discuss the specifics of the cases or the rulings. 
Nor do we discuss the ethical aspects of campaign finance rules (on this, see Alzola 2013; Néron, 2015). 
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END CORPORATE PERSONHOOD NOW!  
The corporate abolitionist movement, led by the umbrella organization Move to Amend, 
rallies around slogans such as “End Corporate Rule,” “Corporations Are Not People” or “I’ll 
believe corporations are people when Texas executes one.”5 These catchphrases express a 
variety of powerful intuitions and normative concerns, which need to be carefully untangled. 
Given that they have been formulated by a broad range of activists, social critics, practicing 
lawyers, and academics in diverse intellectual and political contexts, we reconstruct the three 
most prevalent arguments against corporate personhood in general terms. By showcasing their 
implicit philosophical logic, we give these positions their strongest articulation and render 
them more scrutable to normative critique.  
The Abolitionist Narrative 
Like the abolitionist movement of the 19th century, corporate abolitionists frame their cause 
as an issue of human rights (Ripken, 2019). Their most significant slogan is “We the People, 
Not We the Corporations,” because the goal is the adoption by Congress of the so-called “We 
the People Amendment” that revokes all constitutional rights granted to corporations by 
clarifying that these rights were meant for human beings, not the artificial persons created by 
law. The latest version stipulates: “The rights protected by the Constitution of the United 
States are the rights of natural persons only. Artificial entities, such as corporations, limited 
liability companies, and other entities … shall have no rights under this Constitution … The 
 




privileges of artificial entities shall be determined by the People, through Federal, State, or 
local law, and shall not be construed to be inherent or inalienable.”6 
Without an amendment of this kind, abolitionists believe, corporations are in a position 
to abuse the Constitution, and if fact have already done so (Move to Amend, 2012). They 
have hijacked the First Amendment (free speech rights) to influence elections or advertise for 
dangerous products, appealed to the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure rights) to avoid 
subpoenas for unlawful trade or price fixing, and invoked the Fifth Amendment (takings and 
due process rights) to force compensation for future profit losses due to state regulation 
(Move to Amend, 2016). Corporations have also successfully resisted state regulation of their 
activities under the Contracts and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution (Move to Amend, 
2020a). All this poses a threat to “real people,” whose legitimate reaction is to put an end to 
the institution of corporate personhood itself (Program on Corporations, Law and Democracy, 
2010).   
 Some abolitionists, such as activist lawyer Jeffrey Clements (2014), are relatively 
moderate in their proposals. They recognize that corporations must have a special legal status 
and a set of legal rights in order to function but want to ensure that corporations are only 
entitled to the rights granted by state or federal legislation (Move to Amend, 2012). They 
argue that corporations are creatures of state-granted privileges, not the Constitution, and 
point out that the legal personhood assigned by corporate law, which enables corporations to 
contract, sue or be sued, and so on, does not transform corporations into “persons” meriting 
constitutional protections. Some political theorists and legal scholars agree (Ciepley, 2013; 
Greenwood, 2017). From this perspective, ending the constitutional personhood of 
 
6 H. J. Res. 48, 117th Congress (2021-2022). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-joint-
resolution/48/text. At the time of writing, the bill has 74 sponsors. 22 states and over 800 local 




corporations should not impact their day-to-day operations, and of course the rights of 
individuals doing business through them would remain unchanged.  
But other abolitionists target the corporation’s status as a separate legal person more 
broadly. As public interest lawyer-turned sociology professor Ben Manski (2010) explains, 
the general problem with corporate personhood (that would exist even if corporations lacked 
constitutional rights) is that it comes with limited liability, which is to say that liability for the 
wrongs arising from corporate activities is attached to the corporation, not the individual. This 
allows corporate leaders to undertake harmful activities for which they would otherwise bear 
personal responsibility (Move to Amend, 2016).7 Furthermore, with their potentially perpetual 
life, corporations can amass immense power and pose grave dangers to society in the political 
sphere. It follows that granting constitutional personhood to corporations already using their 
legal personhood to aggregate economic power and evade their duties makes a bad problem 
worse.  
Both strands of the abolitionist narrative were around well before Citizens United. In the 
years following law professor-turned public interest lawyer Carl Mayer’s (1990) call for a 
constitutional amendment clarifying that the Constitution was the exclusive preserve of “real 
people,” a number of activists, popular writers, and broadcasters came out in favor of ending 
the “absurdity” of corporate personhood (Grossman, 1996) on the grounds that it was 
intuitively wrong that courts gave corporations the attributes of human beings (Hartmann, 
2002; Nace, 2003). Corporate personhood was a bad thing because, thanks to the infinite 
lifespans afforded by their legal personhood, corporations were effectively “superhuman,” 
able to accumulate wealth and power forever, while we mere mortals were relegated to 
 
7 Note that this is not a critique of limited investor liability, which is not an attribute of corporate 
personhood and raises a different set of issues. 
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“subhuman” status; and it was wrongly given, because the consent of We the People had not 
been secured (Morgan & Edwards, 2002).  
Abolitionists often trace the origins of this state of affairs to the 1886 case of Santa 
Clara,8 in which the Supreme Court assumed that corporations were persons for the purposes 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and, by implication, ruled that due 
process applied to corporate property, making it more difficult to tax. This not only perverted 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s original intent of protecting the rights of former slaves, it made 
a person out of a thing.9 It furthermore broke the path, without any democratic consultation, 
for the addition of other constitutional protections, that have since bolstered the corporate 
quest to escape from state interference (Cray, 2002). The fiction of corporate personhood is 
thus a roadblock that needs to be removed before other means of limiting corporate power and 
restoring democracy can be pursued (Edwards, 2002). 
Calls to abolish the legal status corporations enjoy have cropped up in entirely different 
settings. The alter-globalization movement thus listed the need to eliminate limited liability 
and corporate personhood alongside limitations on capital movements and other controls on 
corporate activity (Cavanagh & Mander, 2002). Related recommendations can be found in 
diverse corners of academic discourse. For example, renowned environmental lawyer James 
Speth (2008) has called for the abolition of corporate personhood in the name of the green 
revolution, while the idea that doing away with corporate personhood will help hold 
executives accountable for corporate crimes has been developed by criminologists (Tombs & 
Whyte, 2015). And it has also been suggested that this will oblige those doing business to 
assume personal responsibility for their actions, in line with classical liberalism (Van Eeghen, 
1997) and Catholic social thought (Quigley, 2004).   
 
8 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
9 These ideas are captured in the slogan, “slavery is the legal fiction that a person is property, corporate 




Given that it has featured in different political and intellectual contexts, the abolitionist 
narrative can be assessed in general terms, and not just confined to its effect on campaign 
finance rules or any particular Supreme Court decision. The abolitionist claim is not that 
corporate personhood should be limited in particular instances, or that corporations should not 
have certain rights, but that the whole doctrine must be thrown out. We propose a rational 
reconstruction of the three basic motivations that support this claim. These may partially 
overlap and reinforce each other, but analytically they are distinct. Certainly, while many may 
accept all three rationales for corporate abolitionism, the justification of the proposal does not 
require the acceptance of all three. It may well be that there is no one single coherent 
argument that all abolitionists share and endorse. 
Corporate Personhood Results in Plutocracy (“The Plutocracy Rationale” hereafter). 
Many of the worries underlying abolitionism stem from the fear that conceiving of 
corporations as bearers of the rights normally reserved for human beings serves to reinforce 
the tremendous economic advantages they derive from their status as legal persons. By 
granting constitutional rights to perpetually existing entities whose legal nature already allows 
those running them to avoid responsibility, the worry goes, corporations are elevated to 
superhuman status. The Plutocracy Rationale thus contends that corporate personhood must 
be abolished as a prerequisite for a functioning and flourishing democracy. The alternative is 
to submit ourselves to a legal regime dominated by a concoction of devious economic 
interests, which facilitates intolerable and ever-growing inequality in social and political 
power.  
The normative underpinning here is broadly speaking egalitarian in orientation. 
Corporate personhood is not ruled out as a deontological matter, or because it does not accord 
with some foundational moral commitment. Instead, the Plutocracy Rationale sees the 
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problem of corporate personhood as resting on its social and political effects. Articulated as a 
counter to the raw efficiency-based or wealth-maximization logic often used to defend 
corporate empowerment, the Plutocracy Rationale holds that whatever the supposed economic 
benefits of corporate personhood are, the doctrine also grants corporations great political and 
economic power, leading to deeply unequal social and political relations. Corporate 
personhood, then, ought to be abolished because the consequences are offensive to the 
egalitarian commitments inherent to a democratic society.  
The Very Idea of Corporate Personhood is Patently Absurd (“The Absurdity 
Rationale” hereafter). Probably the most intuitive justification for the abolitionist proposal, 
captured in slogans about the impossibly of executing corporations, is that the term “corporate 
personhood” defies common sense, is incoherent on its face, and must involve a category 
mistake. Persons are persons; corporations are corporations. This worry is buttressed by the 
fact that even lawyers and judges describe corporate personhood as a “legal fiction,” that is, as 
something that exists only in contemplation of law. Since even specialists understand the 
notion to be contrary to reality, to base our political understandings of rights on such sophistry 
is to invite inanity into society. On the Absurdity Rationale, both corporate constitutional 
personhood and corporate legal personhood are nonsensical and must be eliminated.      
The underlying objection here is that law ought to be scrutable and understandable to 
those subject to it. The idea is simple enough: if law establishes a state of affairs that is 
nonsensical and implausible it ought to be rejected; if a literal interpretation of a statute leads 
to absurd results then commonsense interpretations ought to be preferred. The Absurdity 
Rationale is thus analytically distinct from the Plutocracy Rationale: instead of directing our 
worries toward corporate personhood’s anti-democratic consequences, it translates a concern 
with the law’s coherence vis-à-vis basic social reasoning and concepts. But the two rationales 
can also work in tandem. The widespread affirmation of the absurdity that is corporate 
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personhood can be cited as evidence of malign social influence. Why else would the law be so 
out of step with commonsense social conceptions? Why else introduce such a bizarre and 
counterintuitive doctrine, if not to privilege some interests over others? 
Human Persons Must be Morally Distinct (“The Distinctiveness Rationale” hereafter). 
Abolitionism is also motivated by the idea that our political and ethical commitments require 
distinguishing human persons from corporate persons. By treating corporations as persons, we 
treat them the same as we do humans and thereby dilute the political and moral value of our 
own humanity. The Distinctiveness Rationale suggests that if corporate constitutional 
personhood remains, we will be forced to put corporations on the same constitutional footing, 
and accord them the same rights as other citizens: yesterday the same property and due 
process rights, now the same speech rights and religious freedoms, but tomorrow perhaps the 
same voting rights or the same rights to run for office. When we allow things to become 
persons, we pave the way for a process that reduces us to a kind of subhuman status. An 
unspoken fear here is that if law defines nonhumans as persons, perhaps it can just as easily 
define humans as nonpersons.  
The Distinctiveness Rationale does not require endorsing the Plutocracy or Absurdity 
rationales. We might not think that corporate personhood will necessarily lead to plutocracy 
or that it is inherently absurd and still think that the assignment of rights to corporations 
unjustifiably places them on the same plane as us. The objection here has a Kantian flavor. 
Because corporations are merely means to human ends, not ends in themselves, they are not 
and should not be considered as equal in normative standing. When we treat corporations as 
persons, we undermine the special moral respect that we indisputably owe human persons. 
While the Distinctiveness Rationale can stand alone, it is easy to see the interplay with the 
Absurdity and Plutocracy rationales. If human persons did not deserve special dignity, then 
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corporate personhood would not be as absurd, and we would not need to worry as much about 
its anti-democratic consequences. 
In sum, we might say that the abolitionist position is motivated by three concerns: a 
concern for democratic equality; a concern for social/legal coherence; a concern for the 
priority of human persons in our schemes of normative justification. Abolitionists argue that 
the corporate person offends one or more of these values and, consequently, that some aspect 
of social justice or morality requires that we abandon this legal institution. In what follows, 
we critically evaluate and respond to each rationale in turn. We agree with abolitionists about 
the importance of the underlying values and understand the inclination to see corporate 
personhood as offensive to them. However, we do not believe that these concerns lead to the 
abolitionist conclusion. One need not abolish corporate personhood to criticize, rethink or 
reform the contemporary practice of assigning corporations rights along the lines of these 
values.  
THE PERILS OF CORPORATE ABOLITIONISM 
The Plutocracy Rationale is the justification for abolitionism with the most political cache: we 
should put an end to corporate personhood to prevent big business from accumulating 
nefarious economic and political power to the detriment of individual citizens’ welfare and 
rights. Despite its focus on anti-democratic consequences, abolitionism motivated by this 
rationale typically fails to highlight the societal and political (i.e., not purely economic) 
benefits of corporate personhood, thereby foregoing the opportunity to weigh these against 
the social costs of its misuse. We offer some elements for this comparison. In criticizing the 
Plutocracy Rationale, we do not mean to suggest that the abolitionists’ concerns for 
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democratic equality are unfounded. To the contrary, we argue that a concern for democratic 
equality ought to make us less enthusiastic about corporate abolitionism.  
Corporate Abolitionism is a Blunt Instrument 
Whether corporate abolitionism targets corporate constitutional personhood, corporate legal 
personhood, or both, the Plutocracy Rationale invariably conjures up images of big business 
acting with impunity. There is a sense in which this is understandable: the potential adverse 
effects of business corporations seem proportional to their size. Yet this focus detracts 
attention from the fact that, whatever their size, business corporations are but one species of 
the genus that Eric Orts (2013) calls “organizational persons,” which comprises a large array 
of business and non-business organizations that enable a modern society to function. This 
includes: small private companies, partnerships, cooperatives, benefit corporations, mutuals, 
credit unions, nonprofits, foundations, clubs, scholarly societies, trade unions, political 
parties, schools, universities, museums, places of worship, hospitals, municipalities, 
government agencies, states, and international organizations.  
While they are not all incorporated in the strict meaning of the term, these organizations 
are artificial entities in the sense of being legally recognized and constituted as having 
separate legal personalities and potentially unlimited lifespans. In practice, this means that 
they have the capacity to hold ownership rights over assets that are distinct from the personal 
assets of their founders, executives or employees, and can be used as collateral to raise 
finance and guarantee contractual commitments over time, despite changes in their 
membership. The essential role of organizational law (which is broader than corporate law) is 
that it provides the institutional support organizations need in order to lock-in and deploy 
assets in a prospective manner, contract with one another, and access the courts in cases of 
disputes (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000).  
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The legal personhood of business corporations is no different from that of other 
organizations, so it is hard to see how it might be abolished for the former but not the latter. 
Narrowing the target to constitutional personhood does not change this. One can deny that 
this is a problem in the first place. The We the People Amendment thus simply calls for all 
artificial entities, not just corporations, to be prevented from claiming constitutional 
protections. But this raises important normative questions of its own. The ability of trade 
unions and civic organizations to check corporate power depends on their political voice and 
therefore requires free speech protections (Ellerman, 2020). And the capacity of these and 
other organizations to protect themselves from the whims of captured bureaucrats may be 
seriously impaired without additional constitutional protections. As Kent Greenfield (2018) 
points out, all sorts of organizations would become vulnerable to government overreach, such 
as unreasonable searches, violations of due process or arbitrary censorship.  
Abolitionists claim that such unintended consequences are largely outweighed by the 
highly damaging effects of corporate constitutional personhood (Move to Amend, 2020b) but 
offer little by way of explanation. Instead, they argue that corporate rights-holding is 
superfluous: protections against abuses of government power exist at common law and in 
state and federal law (for example the United States Code) and, at the end of the day, 
individual participants retain their constitutional rights, which they can vindicate in court, 
should the state overstep its bounds. Business corporations thus do not need protections from 
expropriation by government (or rights to due process or just compensation) because their 
shareholders already have these protections (Clements, 2014).  
In assuming that the mere existence of individual protections is sufficient, this 
justification ignores the public goods problem facing shareholders (Olson, 1965). Even if they 
were to agree on the appropriate course of action, individual shareholders have little incentive 
to bear the costs of legal action because the benefits of successful litigation are shared. The 
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larger the benefiting group, the smaller the likelihood of litigation. Government is therefore 
always in a relatively stronger position. This seems all the more probable in cases of artificial 
entities without members, such as foundations, charities, and hospitals, or artificial entities 
whose members hold no property interests, such as churches, universities, and political parties 
(Greenfield, 2018). If their constitutional personhood were abolished, all these organizations 
would find it harder or costlier to secure resources. Corporate abolitionism is, on the whole, a 
blunt instrument. 
Corporate Personhood as an Instrument of Collective Action 
Organizations are human groupings geared toward the collaborative pursuit of relatively 
specified goals that become actors in their own right thanks to their legal recognition as such 
(Coleman, 1990). Corporate personhood, in other words, is a generic instrument for the 
effective pursuit of collective action. Consider Move to Amend, which was endowed with 
corporate personhood following its incorporation as a nonprofit. Incorporation constituted 
what otherwise would have been merely a loose collection of scattered individuals into a 
singular vector for collective action, expanding its ability to collect and retain financial 
resources, and therefore greatly enhancing its lobbying capabilities. This consequence of its 
separate legal personhood would be for nothing if its advocacy did not benefit from free 
speech and other constitutional protections, including those against expropriation by powerful 
officials standing to lose should Move the Amend be successful in achieving its goal.   
Move to Amend’s reliance on the very thing it seeks to abolish shows that corporate 
personhood is Janus-faced: while it can serve to ennoble the position of the rich and powerful, 
the doctrine can also empower the marginalized. Historically, an important fight (and ultimate 
victory) for many voluntary associations was for the right to incorporate. Disfavored political 
and social groups linked with the abolition of slavery, the labor movement, religious 
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minorities, and even literary clubs, were denied this right. Their weak ability to own property 
in perpetuity and mobilize pooled resources in the pursuit of common goals despite 
fluctuating memberships left them small and ephemeral (Bloch & Lamoreaux, 2017). The 
growth of general incorporation laws over the course of the 19th century was a major boon for 
such organizations, as was their gradual assertion of due process and other constitutional 
protections, which allowed, for instance, their members and donors to protect their 
anonymity. 
The long struggle to make access to corporate personhood straightforward and inclusive 
continued well into the 20th century, as discrimination against minorities and various 
dissenting groups remained pervasive. It was only in the 1950s and 1960s that the discretion 
of courts and legislatures to grant the corporate form to advocacy organizations was 
successfully challenged by the civil rights movement, which demanded, in the name of 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and democratic pluralism, that the nonprofit 
corporate form be available to all manner of interest groups as a matter of right (Silber, 2001). 
This resulted in the proliferation of nonprofits armed with free speech and other constitutional 
safeguards, many of which engaged in public interest advocacy by initiating legal actions 
against major business corporations or governments (Berry & Wilcox, 2018).  
Organizations are in a stronger position than individuals to push for new rights or 
defend, qualify, and expand existing ones, because they can overcome the public goods 
problem by speaking in one voice and mobilizing more resources for longer in court, where 
they appear as singular parties thanks to their corporate personhood (Chilton & Versteeg, 
2019). It is thus not surprising that many landmark Supreme Court cases were won by 
incorporated groups exercising free speech and other rights. This was how the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People confronted racial segregation10 and the 
 
10 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
15 
 
New York Times resisted the threat of government censorship.11 And this was how Planned 
Parenthood was able to defend women’s choice12 and the American Civil Liberties Union 
succeeded in making same-sex marriage the law of the land.13 It is significant that America’s 
most prominent defender of constitutional rights firmly opposes corporate abolitionism 
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2012).   
Since many of the individual and collective rights we now cherish were secured in cases 
litigated by corporate persons, it should be clear that corporate personhood is not just a tool 
mobilized by big business to abuse the rights intended for individuals. While business 
corporations have indeed leveraged some of the rights held by individuals and have also 
benefited by expanding those originally secured by nonprofits (sometimes to avoid 
government regulation), they have also fought to uphold citizenship rights against 
governments, especially in developing countries (Crane et al., 2008). More importantly, they 
have acted as what Adam Winkler (2018) calls “constitutional first movers”: early corporate 
rights cases (among which Santa Clara) shaped the very same understanding of equal 
protection and due process guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment that later 
underpinned many of the Supreme Court’s vital rulings, including those outlawing racial 
segregation in schools14 or ensuring political equality based on the one person-one vote 
principle.15  
The protection of individual and collective rights can sometimes require that 
organizations, business or otherwise, be held to account. In cases like the diesel emissions 
scandal, if it were not for the separate legal personhood of Volkswagen, prosecutors would 
 
11 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
12 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
13 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
14 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
15 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 
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only be able to file charges against individual managers or employees. While punishing 
culpable individuals is important on both legal and moral grounds, individuals will not 
typically have pockets deep enough to compensate for the real damages incurred by society. 
By contrast, the possibility to prosecute corporate persons means that something approaching 
real compensation might be possible (Greenfield, 2018). However, if we see corporate 
personhood as a mechanism for enforcing accountability, we need to recognize that 
corporations must also have certain protections. If they no longer had the right to due process 
or the right to a public trial by an impartial jury, it is hard to see what might prevent 
prosecutorial misconduct and other forms of injustice. 
To be sure, corporate personhood can be abused and misused by the founders or 
executives of corporations and other organizations (Maitland, 2017). Shell entities can be set 
up to evade taxes and other responsibilities, and culpable individuals can go unpunished when 
corporate criminal liability is used as a scapegoat. Furthermore, prosecutors sometimes apply 
less stringent standards of justice to corporations (Garrett, 2014a). But corporate personhood 
is like any other legal doctrine in this respect: the potential social costs of its misuse should be 
weighed against the social benefits. What abolitionism motivated by the Plutocracy Rationale 
misses is that corporate personhood is necessary to accomplish all sorts of democratic 
objectives, which would be undermined if we did away with it (Piety, 2015). This does not 
mean that empowering the corporate person is always beneficial. But it does suggest that this 
balance is what the conservation should be about.  
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE PERSONS 
If the Plutocracy Rationale has the most political cache, the most intuitive motivation 
for abolitionism is the Absurdity Rationale, which holds that the idea of corporate 
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personhood ought to be rejected because fictitious corporate entities are not conscious, 
living agents. This objection assumes that “person” is synonymous or co-extensive with 
“human being.” The problem with this assumption is that the law’s definition of 
personhood need not, and does not, correspond to what the term means in ordinary 
language. We show that corporate personhood is more appropriately understood as a 
term of art denoting a point of imputation for rights and duties arising in legal relations. 
Since this definition does not presuppose any intrinsic biological, moral or metaphysical 
qualities, it is no more absurd to assign personhood to corporations than it is to human 
beings. 
The Nature of Legal Personhood 
It is difficult to understand how law works without reflecting on the idea of a person 
(MacCormick, 2007). This is because persons are the primitives of the legal system, the 
fundamental units of the legal order (Pound, 1959). In the same way that the chemist 
thinks of the world as ultimately made up of basic natural kinds, the legal mind thinks of 
the legal world as populated by persons. Law is, to a large extent, about adjusting the 
actions of and relations between persons, and this often involves defining the objects of 
their reciprocal rights and duties. Hence the distinction between “persons” and “things,” 
or “subjects” and “objects,” is essential and can be found in all systems of law and 
political economy, and decisions concerning who or what counts as a person from the 
legal point of view have profound implications.  
The legal way of thinking about the persons that populate the legal realm goes 
back to Roman law, and to the original Latin meaning of persona, which denoted the 
mask work by an actor in a theatrical representation (Gindis, 2016). For Roman lawyers, 
persons were the actors in a legal drama, the ones that courts gave legal standing to as 
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dramatis personae. In other words, they were the subjects of civil rights and duties with 
the ability to act as parties in the drama of litigation. The closely related concept of 
capacitas referred to a status conferred upon citizens for the purpose of enabling them to 
participate in the economic life of the polity (Deakin, 2006). In like manner, modern 
legal systems define capacity as the ability exercised by individuals or organizations to 
enter into legally-binding agreements.  
Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011) usefully distinguish this “performative 
conception” of personhood, which emphasizes the capacity to perform effectively in the 
space of private and public obligations, a view held most notably by Thomas Hobbes, 
from the “intrinsicist conception” of personhood, which reflects in categorical terms the 
essence of what distinguishes persons from non-persons. The latter emphasis on what 
the person is, as opposed to what the person does, goes back to the idea proposed in the 
6th century by Boethius that a person is an “individual substance of a rational nature.” 
This view lies at the foundations of Western philosophy. Witness Immanuel Kant’s 
(2002, p. 46) famous position that “beings without reason … are called things; rational 
beings, by contrast, are called persons.”  
The influence of the intrinsicist conception on our intuitions cannot be understated. 
Indeed, it informs our ordinary language meaning of the term “person,” as well as much 
of our thinking about morality. Significantly, this is the view that is entrenched in 
human rights discourse. As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clarifies, all 
human beings are endowed with reason and conscience (Article 1), and everyone has the 
right to recognition, everywhere, as a person before the law (Article 6).16 In every 
jurisdiction, in other words, every human being – by the mere biological fact of being 
 
16 See http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights. 
19 
 
born human, regardless of nationality, age or physical and mental disposition – is to be 
treated as a subject, as opposed to merely an object, of law.   
Although this principle is a cornerstone of the Western political tradition, positive 
law makes a very clear distinction between the subject of human rights and what Ngaire 
Naffine (2003) calls the “responsible subject.”17 In all jurisdictions, certain classes of 
human beings, including infants, minors, the mentally disabled, and those declared 
legally insane, are deemed to lack the capacity to make legally-binding decisions and 
cannot be held fully accountable for their actions or be subjected to criminal liability. 
The mere biological fact of being born human is insufficient: only a subset of human 
beings – those of a certain age and in sufficient possession of their faculties – meet the 
conditions that define the responsible subject, which courts typically view as the default 
human legal person (Blumenthal, 2007).  
The difference between the subject of human rights and the responsible subject 
underscores the performative conception of personhood and shows that capacity is 
always legally determined, even when extra-legal factors, such as age or mental 
abilities, are used to determine its presence or absence. While infants, minors, the 
mentally disabled, and those declared legally insane have human rights (such as the right 
to life) and are the passive beneficiaries of certain legal provisions (such as the 
protection from bodily harm), the capacity to perform legal acts, namely the ability to 
play an active role in the institutional drama of life, is gained by acquiring rights, 
powers, and duties, which gather cumulatively (Tur, 1987) as human beings grow into 
the paradigmatic adults normally associated with the responsible subject.   
The assignment of rights and duties, like their retraction following a conviction or 
some other relevant change of legal status, epitomizes the constitutive role of law 
 
17 Positive law “decomposes” legal personhood, to borrow Jon Garthoff’s (2019) expression.  
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(Deakin et al., 2017). The persons that populate law’s world are creations of law: they 
are abstract legal artifacts, which serve as hubs for legal relations. Legal persons are 
points of imputation for rights and duties arising in legal relations that are identifiable 
by certain bundles of rights and duties. There are no other characteristics of legal 
personhood. Contrary to the intrinsicist conception of personhood, which requires that 
we start from first principles and consider the biological, metaphysical or moral 
qualities of candidate persons, the conception of personhood used in law is decoupled 
from such considerations. This understanding of legal personhood has important 
implications for our evaluation of corporate abolitionism. 
Implications for Corporate Personhood 
The objection underlying the Absurdity Rationale has a long history. When Pope 
Innocent IV first described the corporation as a persona ficta in the 13th century 
(Canning, 1980), and Edward Coke argued that a corporation exists only in abstracto in 
the 17th century,18 this was the view they subscribed to. Their refusal to hold 
corporations liable on precisely these grounds is the source of the maxim, attributed to 
Edward Thurlow, that the corporation has “no body to kick, no soul to damn.” While 
intuitively appealing, this position is grounded in the intrinsicist conception of the 
person and therefore deviates from law’s more abstract notion of personhood.  
Nothing precludes law from constituting nonhuman legal persons. Corporate 
persons are a case in point. The distinction between the legal personhood of human 
beings and the legal personhood of corporations cannot be that the former is “natural” 
and therefore legitimate, while the latter is “artificial” and hence illegitimate. Legal 
 
18 Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (1612). 
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personhood is always artificial in the same sense that property or other established legal 
institutions are artificial, and it is no more a fiction to assign the capacity to perform 
legal acts to human beings than it is to corporations or other sorts of organizations. 
Human beings and corporations are persons in the same sense of being the constituent 
right-and-duty-bearing parties in legal relations. This is the only definition of legal 
personhood which includes all of law’s persons, human or otherwise (Gindis, 2016).  
We must resist our inclination toward ordinary language and other extra-legal 
ideas of the person if the discussion of corporate personhood is to advance without 
needless equivocations. As John Dewey (1926, p. 656) observed, “what ‘person’ 
signifies in popular speech, or in psychology, or in philosophy or morals, [is] as 
irrelevant, to employ an exaggerated simile, as it would be to argue that because a wine 
is called ‘dry,’ it has the properties of dry solids; or that, because it does not have those 
properties, wine cannot possibly be ‘dry.’” While some parts of our discourse are 
informed by a view of persons in the intrinsicist sense, other parts are informed by the 
performative conception. It is important to understand that legal personhood falls 
unambiguously in the latter category. To refer to “corporate personhood” is to use 
language technically and perhaps counterintuitively, but it is not incoherent or absurd.  
That said, we must also acknowledge that the legal notion of personhood has a 
wider normative significance (Samuels, 1988). Our deeply-held cultural and moral 
convictions tend to interpret corporate personhood in terms of the intrinsicist 
conception, and it is the tension between the institutional logic of the legal domain and 
our social system of beliefs that fuels the backlash against corporate personhood 
(Ripken, 2019). It may seem that this tension could be defused if the legal view of 
personhood were to make room for biological or moral considerations. Law could, for 
example, reserve the term “person” for human beings and refer to corporations (and 
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other organizations) as “legal entities.” But we would still need a term for the class of 
legal actors comprising human beings and corporations (Fuller, 1967). And we would 
still need to address the substantive issue underpinning the debate: the real question is 
which rights corporations ought to have. 
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Recall the worry underlying the Distinctiveness Rationale: by seeing human beings and 
corporations as persons in the same legal sense we are required to assign corporate 
persons the same constitutional status, thereby diluting our own moral and political 
standing. This position assumes that all legal persons have or can claim the same bundle 
of constitutional rights. But this is not the case: a legal regime can assign rights to 
corporate persons without assigning them all the rights of human persons. The challenge 
is not whether we can distinguish the rights of human persons from those of corporate 
persons; it is rather how to draw a principled distinction that preserves the priority of the 
former over the latter without damaging the efficacy of corporate institutions or the 
functioning of liberal democracies. We think the answer may lie in a pragmatist 
commitment to institutional experimentation and social deliberation.  
Corporate Constitutional Rights: Derivative or Sui Generis? 
It is important to unpack the concept of legal rights. As Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld 
(1919) famously noted, the term is used indiscriminately to denote four different kinds 
of legal advantage that really ought to be distinguished A legal right can refer to: (a) a 
legal power, namely the ability to bring about some change in one’s or others’ legal 
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situation by performing some operative action; (b) a legal privilege or liberty, namely 
the absence of any contrary legal duty; (c) a legal claim, which is the correlative of a 
corresponding legal duty of some other party; or (d) a legal immunity from some legal 
consequence, which is the correlative of the absence of some other party’s legal power 
to effect that consequence.  
Rights can furthermore be classified as “active,” when they require the right-
holder’s actions, or “passive,” when they involve recognition or action by others 
(Rainbolt, 2006). The distinction applies to constitutional rights, which are a species of 
legal rights, albeit a fundamental one (Wellman, 2016). Liberty-rights (to speak or 
assemble) and power-rights (to vote) are active; claim-rights (to just compensation) and 
immunity-rights (against double jeopardy) are passive. The scope and exercise of rights 
is not absolute. For example, free speech is limited because it does not extend to libel or 
incitement to violence, while voting rights do not belong to citizens of other nation-
states or corporate persons. That constitutional rights do not automatically or 
categorically extend to corporate persons raises, but does not answer, a series of 
complex questions.  
Professing an unwavering belief that constitutional rights are inalienable and 
belong to human beings alone does not really explain why corporate persons ought to be 
unconditionally excluded from being bearers or claimants of constitutional rights. The 
Constitution recognizes some inalienable rights which apply only to human persons 
based on certain intrinsic biological or moral properties they possess, but it also codifies 
the civil rights of citizens, which are a far murkier category. Contrary to the freedom of 
thought (or the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness famously mentioned in 
the Declaration of Independence), the assignment of civil rights is performative: it 
expresses the status conferred on some in a specific legal and political regime and 
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cannot be decided based solely on the presence or absence of human qualities. Their 
purposes must be considered (Garrett, 2014b).  
To this end, the Supreme Court deploys, or ought to deploy, a “functional purpose 
and fit analysis” which asks what the objective of the right is and whether extending it 
to the claimant will fulfil that objective (Pollman, 2011; Robinson, 2016). Many 
constitutional rights are meant to limit governmental overreach, so what matters is the 
constraint on government, not the identity of the right-holder (Greenfield, 2018). The 
immunity-right against unreasonable search and seizure and the claim-right to just 
compensation in the event that property is taken for public use have been assigned to 
corporate persons, not because of any intrinsic properties they may share with human 
persons, but because doing so serves the purpose of limiting arbitrary uses of 
government power. By contrast, the power-right to vote has not been extended to 
corporate persons because this would not serve its purpose of allowing what Amy 
Sepinwall (2012) calls “normative citizens” to use the ballot to take part in the joint 
project of the nation-state. 
In cases where it has extended constitutional protections to corporate persons, it 
seems that the Court has generally believed that this was a necessary or convenient way 
to protect or enhance the rights of human persons. As Margaret Blair and Elizabeth 
Pollman (2015) argue, the Court has long viewed corporations as aggregates of 
individuals, and corporate constitutional rights as “derivative” of the “original” rights of 
those individuals. Thus, when it extends the liberty-right to free speech to, say, a news 
corporation, it understands the corporate liberty-right to free speech to be derivative of 
the active liberty-right to free speech of the editors and reporters involved. But it also 
instrumentally protects the rights of third parties, namely the readers’ or listeners’ 
passive claim-right of non-interference against the government (Kendrick, 2017). This 
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explanation of the Court’s thinking does not imply that its rulings never end up harming 
people any more than it suggests that they are always morally just.  
Even the legal coherence of some of the Court’s rulings can be called into 
question. The idea that granting corporate persons constitutional rights is a way of 
giving effect to their members’ original rights conflicts with the basic legal principle 
that the corporation is a separate legal person with its own rights and duties. Legally, the 
corporate person has a sui generis capacity for property, contract, and litigation, such 
that when it enters a legally-binding agreement to acquire assets, for example, it is not 
exercising its members’ rights, but exercising its own rights, on its own behalf. The 
same ought to hold for corporate constitutional rights. Historically, it seems that fewer 
rights were granted to corporations when the Court upheld this principle, and more 
rights were granted when it was disregarded (Winkler, 2018).19 Of course, whatever the 
justification for granting corporations rights and whatever their provenance, once 
assigned they are not reducible to the rights of individuals; they are, properly speaking, 
the corporate person’s.  
It might be objected that corporate persons cannot really hold rights because to 
hold a right is to have the autonomous ability to decide whether or not to enforce it 
(Steiner, 1998). On this “will theory of rights,” which relies on the intrinsicist 
conception of personhood, only an agent can be a real legal right-holder (Wellman, 
1995), and only active rights count. This implies that infants are not real right-holders, 
and that a corporation can only be a real right-holder if it has volition. Similar questions 
underlie contemporary discussions of corporate moral agency and corporate moral 
personhood (Schragger & Schwartzman, 2016).20 This is grist for the abolitionist’s mill: 
 
19 Paradoxically, corporate empowerment has thus been curbed by more corporate personhood, not less 
(Greenfield, 2018).  
20 It is impossible to do justice to this rich literature associated with Thomas Donaldson (1982) and 
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to view corporations as the types of things capable of bearing rights seems to imply that 
we see them as possessing wills or other things that are uniquely human.  
Yet rights need not imply such thick metaphysical commitments about volition. 
Relevant normative, legal, and political arguments can and ought to be made with as 
minimal metaphysical commitments as possible, given that such commitments are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing the desirability of corporate personhood 
(Singer, 2018). It may be legitimate to recognize corporate rights even if corporations 
are not moral persons, or to deny corporations certain rights, even if it turned out that 
they were moral persons (Sepinwall, 2015). We may also hold corporations legally 
responsible even if they are not proper moral agents. There can be valid public policy 
reasons for doing any of these things. The important institutional fact is that corporate 
persons are legal agents, and the important question is which rights these legal agents 
ought to have. The will theory of rights is of little help here. 
When rights are instead construed as involving the normative protection of some 
aspect of the right-holder’s interests (Kramer, 2001), what matters is that these are 
protected, in the sense that duties toward the right-holder are imposed on others, 
regardless of the right-holder’s volition. This “interest theory of rights” accommodates 
active and passive rights, and extends to infants and other non-autonomous human 
persons while applying to non-autonomous nonhuman persons such as corporations 
(Kurki, 2019).21 Organizations set up to pursue the interests of their members despite 
membership changes, or fulfil the purposes of their founders beyond their lifetimes, 
have an interest in cohesion and persistence, which we ought to recognize, taking into 
account the interests of third parties or the community (Pettit, 2015). This view sits 
 
others here. 




comfortably with the idea that corporate persons might be granted rights in order that 
they can perform effectively in the space of private and public obligations. 
The Priority of Human Persons 
Corporate persons can be legitimate holders of constitutional rights and nothing in the 
doctrine of corporate personhood requires that corporations be granted the same 
complement of rights as human persons. But the Distinctiveness Rationale cannot be 
rebutted by merely distinguishing the rights granted to corporate persons from those 
held by human persons. The trouble is that once certain rights are assigned to corporate 
persons, they become not just sui generis but also very difficult to weaken or reverse, 
making them, as abolitionists argue, potentially a threat to ordinary citizens. Yet while 
corporations can leverage constitutional rights to amass economic and political power, 
the idea that abolishing corporate personhood will help restore democracy – recall the 
primary motivation of the Plutocracy Rationale – is a nonstarter, as this will also 
eliminate vital resources for collective action and democratic empowerment. 
Consequently, if we value democratic equality and want to preserve a vibrant and 
open civil society, we need a principled way of ensuring the priority of human over 
corporate persons which not only preserves the efficacy of corporate institutions but also 
prevents law from defining humans as nonpersons. One prominent strategy involves 
what may be called the “deontic priority” argument. Derived from the Kantian accent on 
the uniquely human attribute of autonomy and rationality (or at least the disposition for 
autonomy and rationality), this argument suggests that because corporate persons are 
non-autonomous means to human ends, their rights do not deserve the same respect 
(Dan-Cohen, 1986). Whatever its merits, this approach is very closely connected with 
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the intrinsicist notion of personhood and the will theory of rights, which we believe are 
not necessary to establish the priority of human persons.  
A somewhat less categorical argument stems from the political conception of 
citizens as “self-authenticating sources” of claims on the institutions of society (Rawls, 
1993). This Neo-Kantian approach translates the idea of human beings as ends in 
themselves into the idea of human beings as moral persons that are owed a justification 
for the conditions and treatment imposed onto them by others, and especially by social, 
legal, and political institutions (Forst, 2014). Given that corporations are such 
institutions, they are not the sorts of entities to which justifications are owed. It follows 
that corporate persons should have those rights that can be justified by and to human 
persons, but that they do not require (and should not be granted) those rights owed to 
beings that have a right to justification. The content and nature, but also the extent and 
limitation, of corporate rights is determined on behalf of, not in spite of, a foundational 
moral regard that we reserve for human beings as justificatory agents. 
But the claim that corporations ought to have those rights that can be justified to 
human persons, and not those rights that cannot be justified to human persons, seems 
mealy-mouthed. Moreover, its premise, that we do not have to justify ourselves to 
corporate persons, is implausible, given that cases where corporate persons challenge 
the way they are treated by prosecutors or tax authorities are cases where they seek 
justification. Courts do not dismiss these challenges on the basis that the state need not 
justify itself to corporations. To help us secure at a principled level the distinctiveness 
and priority of human persons over their corporate counterparts in our scheme of rights 
and liberties, an alternative route is needed. Philosophical pragmatism, we submit, can 
offer a fruitful avenue in this respect.  
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Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that, though diverse and containing various 
interpretations, is fundamentally committed to the idea that our knowledge of the world 
cannot be separated from our engagement with it. Concepts and normative categories are 
seen as forms of action that we engage because of their supposed consequences. For 
pragmatists, the test of an idea’s validity is fundamentally linked with its usefulness; it 
is not evaluated in terms of its fit with first principles. Because of its practical 
orientation and its anti-foundationalism, scholars in business ethics and management 
studies are increasingly turning to pragmatism as a touchstone for analyses that are 
capable of social critique yet resistant to the sorts of commitments that are difficult to 
maintain in a diverse and complex world (Farjoun et al., 2015; Visser, 2019).  
Pragmatism offers us a chance to set aside grand moral theories about rights in 
order to focus more directly on the consequences of different sorts of social action 
(Pouryousefi & Freeman, forthcoming). Its methodological resistance to deontological 
positions, which can lead to the intrinsicist conception of personhood and the will theory 
of rights, makes it uniquely suited to the task of addressing the question of corporate 
personhood (Singer, 2019). And its normative commitment to democratic equality as a 
basis for criticizing social and economic institutions also allows us to engage with the 
worries underlying the Plutocracy and Distinctiveness rationales. 
These attractive features of pragmatism flow from its core tenet of fallibilism: 
because we know we are fallible, we cannot pre-commit ourselves to any particular core 
doctrine with certainty (Dewey, 1920). We must instead always subject our beliefs and 
convictions to an ongoing process of falsification through exposure to new ideas, new 
experiences, and open reason-giving. The firm commitment to maintaining the channels 
of inquiry and experimentation necessary for establishing which actions and conceptions 
will lead to which consequences means that nothing is inherently off the table, as long 
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as we do not short-circuit our ability to reflect upon and revise our considered collective 
moral and political judgments (Bohman, 1999). We thus have a principled reason for 
both recognizing corporate persons – corporate voice adds a valuable point of view to 
the process of social deliberation – and asserting that whatever rights we assign to them 
are reconfigurable or even reversible. 
The question of which rights ought to be assigned to corporate persons is 
something to be critically and experimentally determined (Dewey, 1927). It must always 
remain subject to reflection, justification, and revision. To claim either that personhood 
must be reserved for humans, or that the common legal designator of personhood 
requires an equal bundle of rights, is to let social institutions and conventions dictate the 
terms of social analysis, when it ought to be the other way around. Of course, one might 
worry that this sort of reflexive stance could justify restricting rights of human persons 
as well. Would we not have to subject basic human rights to the same sort of potential 
revision? How can we preserve the distinctiveness and priority of human persons when 
disavowing the very idea of categorical prioritization, potentially subjecting everything 
to radical reflection and critique?  
From a pragmatist perspective, the contingency of corporate rights and the priority 
of human persons can be asserted and defended by reference to the conditions necessary 
for legitimate, competent, and effective inquiry. Effectively answering the question of 
which rights we should grant to corporate persons presupposes that we have a system of 
collective inquiry capable of identifying the individual and collective interests that merit 
protection and assessing the consequences of the legal and political decisions underlying 
alternative assignments of rights. In modern societies, a crucial part of this system of 
inquiry is the protection of political and social rights associated with democracy, which 
we grant to human persons to guarantee their inclusive and equal participation in the 
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social processes of experimentation, assessment, and reflection. This is why pragmatists 
are committed to democratic equality (Jackson 2018).  
On the “democratic priority” view defended here, human persons have a claim to 
equal treatment not because of their intrinsic capacities, but because to do otherwise 
undermines our epistemic confidence in, and thus the legitimacy of, our institutionalized 
forms of collective inquiry – the processes by which things come to be known or 
decided upon at a societal level (Knight & Johnson, 2011). The priority of human 
persons, and the principled reason to promote and vigorously guard their equal 
“empowered inclusion” (Warren, 2017), is due to democracy’s particular social-
epistemic competence, not its derivation from a set of moralized human essences. The 
democratic priority argument thus offers a fairly parsimonious explanation of why 
corporate persons can have rights but are not entitled to the same presumption of 
equality as human persons are. It also helps explain why we should want to attenuate or 
restrict corporate persons from having certain rights as a matter of principle.  
When deciding, for instance, whether corporate persons should have the same 
rights as human persons to support favored political candidates, we should ask whether 
this would corrupt or stunt the democratic background necessary for collective inquiry. 
Whenever it contributes to an unequal ability of human persons to participate in 
democratic procedures and deliberation, we undermine democracy’s attractive 
experimental and reflexive qualities (Singer, 2019). Restricting the political and civic 
freedoms of corporate persons thus will often be warranted, despite the fact that they are 
generally capable of bearing rights. Given that the basis for such rights is in their 
contribution for epistemic and social inquiry, the political speech rights of corporate 
persons, notably those designed to accumulate stores of wealth, ought not receive the 
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same level of protection as human persons’ rights, lest we undercut our ability to reflect 
upon and revise such an institutional arrangement. 
CONCLUSION 
The view that the assignment of constitutional rights to corporations is a judicial travesty is 
shared by a broad range of activists, social critics, practicing lawyers, legislators, and 
academics, many of whom back proposals to restrict constitutional rights to human beings and 
abolish corporate personhood. Corporate abolitionism stems from three genuine concerns, 
namely that corporate personhood enables a plutocratic regime, trades in absurd legal 
designations, and intolerably places corporate and human persons on equal normative footing. 
In response, we have shown that corporate abolitionism is a blunt instrument that unjustifiably 
removes an important tool for collective action and democratic empowerment; that corporate 
personhood is a legal term of art and a rather straightforward one at that; and finally that there 
is nothing in the doctrine of corporate personhood that requires corporate persons be granted 
the same complement of rights as human persons. 
Although corporate abolitionism is ill-advised and the abolitionist amendment will 
likely never be adopted, the abolitionist movement has done much both to spread 
awareness of the perils of corporate empowerment and to mobilize political energies 
around this important issue. These efforts may not be in vain: sustained democratic 
deliberation about the institutional infrastructure of society, as Manski (2017) notes, can 
be a powerful vector for effecting political change. For example, although the women’s 
movement fight for the Equal Rights Amendment to prohibit sex discrimination was 
unsuccessful in the 1970s, the law today operates as if the amendment had been adopted 
(Hartley, 2017). This outcome was not produced by a single-minded focus on a 
33 
 
constitutional amendment but rather by the direction of collective energies and resources 
toward many smaller policy battles.  
There is a lesson for the abolitionist movement here. For instance, concerns over 
corporate empowerment may be better served by trying to compel the Supreme Court to 
recognize that corporate speech is substantively different from other kinds of speech. 
The Court has reversed over 300 of its own decisions, including in several of the cases 
mentioned in this paper (Congressional Research Service, 2016). In about half of these 
cases, rulings were overturned within the first 20 years; two thirds were overturned 
within 30 years. Citizens United thus represents the beginning, not the end, of the debate 
about the scope of First Amendment rights for corporate persons (Orts, 2013). To gain 
more traction in this debate, critics of corporate constitutional rights need to formulate 
stronger arguments in support of their position.  
We believe that such arguments are bound to fail if they are expressed in 
categorical terms, treat corporate personhood as nothing but an aberration, and bundle 
all kinds of constitutional rights together. Given that the justifications for different 
corporate rights are as varied as the organizations that are affected, any serious critique 
requires care and nuance. We have suggested some ways of thinking about these issues, 
centering on the pragmatist commitment to open and reflexive social inquiry, and the 
related normative commitment to democratic equality. Instead of attempting to abolish 
corporate personhood simpliciter or eliminating all corporate rights, such commitments 
favor political debates over which rights corporations should not be granted and how to 
reconfigure the rights they do have in order to protect democratic equality. This will 
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